Regulation that Defies Gravity - Policy, Economics and Law of Legal Immigration in Europe by KOCHAROV, Anna
 VOLUME 4       EJLS   ISSUE 2 
 9 
 
 
          
 
 
 
European Journal of Legal Studies 
 
Title: Regulation that Defies Gravity - Policy, Economics and Law of Legal 
Immigration in Europe 
Author(s): Anna Kocharov 
Source: European Journal of Legal Studies, Volume 4, Issue 2 (Autumn/Winter 
2011), p. 9-43 
 
 
Abstract:  
 
This article offers an assessment of EU directives in the field of legal immigration in the 
light of the Union’s own claims of economic rationale behind its immigration policy. While 
stopping short of economic analysis of law, the work pinpoints the areas of EU 
immigration law of relevance to economists in future immigration research in the 
European context, and to policy makers when enacting immigration laws. It is argued 
that, contrary to the political discourse, EU immigration law is inconsistent with the 
objectives of EU immigration policy and fails to take into account economic rationales for 
migration. 
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1. Introduction 
 
EU policy-makers and European governments increasingly favor immigration 
policy linked to the demand for labor. The proponents of this approach argue that 
Europe should welcome immigrants who bring with them skills required in our 
economies, while their opponents claim that this approach dehumanizes migrants 
ignoring their non-economic needs. This article analyzes the legal substance 
behind these claims and discusses whether the two seemingly opposing camps can 
at all be disconnected the way they are portrayed in European politics. To do this, 
the official objectives of common immigration policy (CIP) of the EU will be 
matched against the actual effect of the legislation adopted to achieve them, while 
introducing some basic notions from the economics of migration as benchmark for 
the policy-law comparison. This will take out the politics from immigration policy 
and offer a systematic look at how the law is used to achieve CIP goals. Does the 
substance of law correspond to its declared objectives? 
 
Five caveats apply. First, the analysis is limited common immigration policy as 
opposed to immigration rooted in international human rights law (refugees and 
asylum seekers): the rationales and objectives valid for one group of immigrants are 
not easily transferable to the other, while the body of law applicable to the two 
types of migrants significantly differs. Second, the analysis is limited to EU 
Directives on legal as opposed to illegal migration: this is for the sake of space and 
because legal migration is the most controversial branch of immigration law 
politically, making the distinction between politics and policy not readily apparent; 
the match between the policy objectives and the law is less obvious in the 
Directives on legal immigration, many provisions of which remain optional and 
open-worded. Third, the analysis is limited to the EU law and policy as opposed to 
the national (implementing) measures. Fourth, while immigration policy is an 
inherently interdisciplinary field, the analysis presented here omits other factors 
that may influence immigration flows, such as the general economic situation, the 
presence of immigrant networks, cultural and historic ties, etc. In the discussion of 
the economics of migration, for each of the selected factors, the analysis will 
assume that the other factors remain equal. Fifth, EU policy objectives are taken at 
their face value, presuming their legitimacy and appropriateness, while 
questioning instead the feasibility of their accomplishment through the enacted 
laws. The terms “immigrant”, “migrant”, and “third-country national” are used 
interchangeably throughout to refer to persons not in the possession of nationality 
of any EU or EFTA state, who come to the EU as a primary migrant, as opposed to 
the second and third generations of third-country nationals and family members of 
the primary migrant or “sponsor”.  
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The paper proceeds in two parts. Part I unpacks the objectives of common 
immigration policy contained in EU policy documents and legal texts, and 
discusses how these objectives may be attained. Part II analyzes EU immigration 
law in light of EU policy objectives, using economics of immigration as a tool to 
evaluate the match between the policy and the law. Results are then summarized 
and discussed. 
 
2. Objectives of Common Immigration Policy 
2.1 Sources of Objectives and Their Relevance 
 
The Amsterdam Treaty reform of 1999 introduced a power for the EU – then the 
European Community – to regulate immigration. This new power, however, was 
not accompanied by any objectives in the text of the Treaty itself, prompting 
commentators to describe the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ), which 
incorporates the CIP, as “singularly less specific”1 than other Community policies. 
The only thing one could infer from the text of the Treaty itself was that EU 
immigration policy was somehow tied to the establishment of the internal market 
and the Schengen space.2 Objectives of the CIP were de facto – and, with the 
Lisbon Treaty, are de jure3 – formulated by the European Council and are found, 
first, in the Council Conclusions, second, in the policy documents of the 
Commission, and, third, in the explanatory memoranda to legislative proposals and 
preambles to the Directives on legal immigration. This fluid system of objective-
setting adds flexibility to EU immigration policy while simultaneously rendering it 
more vulnerable to momentary political concerns of national governments. It has 
been noted that without concrete objectives listed alongside the competence 
provisions in the Treaty, the prominence of objectives is diluted, encouraging 
pragmatic over visionary approach to EU immigration law;4 proposals on 
immigration law easily turn into a battle over national sovereignty where each 
                                            
1 E. Guild and H. Staples,‘Labor Migration in the European Union’ in P. DeBruycker (ed) The 
Emergence of a European Immigration Policy (Bruylant 2003) 214. 
2 The name itself of the original Title IV EC supports this conclusion: “Visas, Asylum, Immigration 
and other Policies Related to Free Movement of Persons”. The new Title V TFEU, successor to 
Title IV EC, is called “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”. Its first article, Article 67 TFEU, 
proclaims that the Union as a whole – as opposed to only the Schengen area in the previous Treaty 
version – shall constitute AFSJ; however, the second point of this article links EU immigration 
policy to the absence of internal border controls – and thus back to the Schengen space. 
3 Art. 68 TFEU. 
4 G. Papagianni, Institutional and Policy Dynamics of EU Migration Law (2006) 197-262. 
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Member State seeks to export its model to the EU.5 EU and national immigration 
policies should take into account other Union policies in order not to jeopardize 
the latter.6 Consistency, however, is a small consolation for anyone looking for the 
purpose of Union’s immigration law. 
 
With the re-shuffling of the Union’s purposes in the Lisbon Treaty and the 
increasing prominence of the AFSJ, the broad objectives of the CIP are now stated 
in Article 79 TFEU. This Treaty article restates the three main policy strands 
formulated over the preceding decade by the European Council. The Union’s 
immigration policy should thus ensure “efficient management of migration flows”, 
“fair treatment” of legally resident third-country nationals, and the prevention of 
illegal immigration. 
2.2 Objective 1: State Management of Immigration 
 
Two questions call for answer before proceeding to the substance of EU’s 
“managed immigration policy”.  
 
The first is whether and to what extent a state can manage its immigration flow. 
Management of immigration flow by the state implies two basic functions: (1) 
capacity of the state to de-select immigrants from entry and residence in its 
territory and (2) capacity of the state to attract and retain immigrants. The capacity 
of Member States to restrict immigration is inherently incomplete, not least due to 
the existing legal framework in international law.7 On the other hand, the EU has 
enacted directives on illegal immigration and return,8 necessary for implementing 
                                            
5 S. Boelaert-Suominen, ‘Non-EU Nationals and Council Directive 2003/109/EC on the Status of 
Third-Country Nationals Who Are Long-Term Residents: Five Paces Forward and Possibly Three 
Paces Back’ [2005] C.M.L.Rev. 42; Peers, ‘Implementing Equality? The Directive on long-term 
resident third-country nationals’ [2004] EL Rev. 29; Louise Halleskov, ‘The Long-Term Residents 
Directive: A Fulfilment of the Tampere Objective of Near-Equality?’ [2005] EJML 7. 
6 Joined Cases 281, 283, 284, 285 and 287/85 Germany and others v. Commission [1987] ECR 03203. 
This principle has been adopted in the Lisbon Treaty: for instance, new Article 21(3) TEU on the 
external action states that “The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its 
external action and between these and its other policies”. 
7 Most notably, Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Rome (4.11.1950) as amended; European Convention on the Legal Status 
of Migrant Workers (1977); Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees (1951); ILO C143 
Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention (1975); C97 Migration for Employment 
Convention (Revised) (1949); Cases Gaygusuz v Austria (ECHR, 16 September 1996) and Jabari v 
Turkey (ECHR, 11 July 2000). 
8 Regulation 562/2006 Schengen Borders Code, Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and 
procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, Directive 
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the Schengen space and abolition of internal borders.9 The competence to restrict 
is therefore not only regulated but presents fewer open questions as regards the 
content of policy: foreign nationals may not enter the territory of the state unless 
specifically authorized either by the state itself, by international or Union law. And 
here comes in the policy component. If the policy is, as it is in Europe, to 
encourage immigration by some foreign nationals only, then we need to examine 
closely the capacity of Member States to attract these people. This capacity is much 
less restricted by supranational law and is determined instead by a number of 
factors, including but not limited to the admission policy, legal protection of the 
rights of migrants, and (economic) situation in the host state. The rest of this 
article will analyze how EU immigration law affects the capacity of Member States 
to attract and retain “wanted” immigrants. 
 
The second question of “managed immigration policy” concerns the instruments 
that a state can use to manage immigration efficiently. Labor immigration quotas 
have been criticized for inability of the public administrator to identify the 
fluctuating needs of the business community10 and for the rigid nature of the 
system that cannot timely react to changes in the demand for workers.11 While 
state-managed schemes will likely deplete the resources of any public 
administration, by changing its legislation a state can influence individual 
decisions of migrants and thus affect the volume and composition of immigration 
flow.12 The skills of immigrants, in particular, “can be directly influenced by 
immigration policy”.13 Governments may provide “incentives for foreign skills to 
flow in or remain in the country, for instance by easing immigration and work 
permits restrictions, providing tax incentives, and promoting the country as an 
attractive working and living environment.”14 Points systems increase the share of 
                                                                                                                                       
2009/52/EC providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of 
illegally staying third-country nationals. 
9 In particular, abolition of internal borders does not present any problem of legal immigration 
because all third-country nationals are required to report their presence on arrival to another 
Member State, failing which they become illegal, Articles 11 and 21 Schengen Borders Code. 
10 A. Constant and K.F. Zimmermann, ‘Immigrant Performance and Selective Immigration Policy: a 
European Perspective’ [2005] 195 National Institute Economic Review 105. 
11 G. Orcalli, ‘Constitutional choice and European immigration policy’ [2007] 18 Constit Polit Econ 
9. 
12 M. Ruhs and P. Martin, ‘Numbers vs. Rights: Trade-Offs and Guest Worker Programs’ [2008] 42 1 
IMR 253. 
13 M. Ruhs, ‘Economic Research and Labour Immigration Policy’ [2008]  24 3 Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 406. 
14 S. Mahroum, ‘Europe and the Immigration of Highly Skilled Labour’ [2001] 39 5 International 
Migration 29. 
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skilled immigrants in the overall immigration flow;15 however, their success 
depends on the favorable disposition of other factors, such as employment 
opportunities in the destination country and the wage differential with the country 
of origin. The weakness of the points systems has been their inability to guarantee 
jobs, leading to significant brain waste. This has been the case in Canada16, the 
UK17, and New Zealand18, suggesting that employers should be closely involved in 
the admission of economic migrants.19 Yet, uncontrolled employer-driven systems 
may “discourage employers from raising wages and/or adopting alternative 
production technologies, thus exacerbating shortages and entrenching certain low-
cost production systems in the long run.”20 Thus, no single stakeholder, not even 
the state, is placed in the position to manage immigration in isolation from others. 
State management of immigration requires a system that is flexible enough to 
timely react to the changing circumstances and to accommodate participation by 
non-state actors.  
2.3 Objective 2: Competing for the Highly-Skilled 
 
Over the past half-a-century, Western Europe witnessed remarkable turnarounds 
in its immigration policies. Low-skilled labor immigration in the 1960s was 
followed by a closure to economic immigrants after the oil crisis of 1973, this 
principle reiterated by the Council as recently as 1994.21 However, only a few years 
                                            
15 R. Iredale, ‘The Internationalization of Professionals and the Assessment of Skills: Australia, 
Canada, and the US’ [2002] 16 Georgetown Immigration L.J. 797; J. Walsh, ‘Navigating 
Globalization; Highly-Skilled Labor Migration and State Management: The Cases of Canada and 
Australia’ [2006] Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, 
www.allacademic.com (25.02.2010); A. Shachar, ‘The Race for Talent: Highly-Skilled Migrants and 
Competitive Immigration Regimes’ 151-152 citing OECD, ‘International Mobility of the Highly 
Skilled’ 88 [2001] 29. 
16 R. Iredale, ‘The Need to Import Skilled Personnel: Factors Favouring and Hindering its 
International Mobility’ [1999] 37 1 International Migration 98. 
17 C. Dustmann, ‘Immigrants and the Labour Market’ [2008] 16 4 European Review 508. 
18 M. Benson-Rea and S. Rawlinson, ‘Highly Skilled and Business Migrants: Information Processes 
and Settlement Outcomes’ [2003] 41 2 International Migration. 
19 J. Doomernik, R. Koslowski, J. Laurence, R. Maxwell, I. Michalowski, D. Thränhardt, ‘No 
Shortcuts: Selective Migration and Integration’ [2009] Transatlantic Academy Report, 
www.transatlanticacademy.org. 
20 M. Ruhs, ‘Economic Research and Labour Immigration Policy’ [2008] 24 3 Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 421. 
21 Council Resolution of 20 June 1994 on limitation on admission of third-country nationals to the 
territory of the Member States for employment and Council Resolution of 30 November 1994 
relating to the limitations on the admission of third-country nationals to the territory of the 
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later, the Lisbon Strategy goals necessitated the admission of economic migrants 
in order to secure the international competitiveness of Europe.22 The Hague 
European Council Conclusions explicitly mentioned establishment of admission 
procedures capable of responding promptly to the fluctuating demand for migrant 
workers. The objective of a more “selective” and better “managed” immigration 
policy is reiterated in the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum23 and found 
support of many governments at the national level.24 The Stockholm Program calls 
for a flexible admission system that is responsive to the priorities, needs, numbers 
and volumes determined by each Member State and that enables migrants to take 
full advantage of their skills and competence. Such immigration policy should 
benefit “all stakeholders”.25 
 
It would, however, be erroneous to assume that Europe re-opened its doors to 
economic immigrants. Proposal of the Commission on the admission of third-
country nationals for employment met little enthusiasm in the Council and was 
subsequently withdrawn.26 Member States found it difficult to agree on a common 
admission policy, as the demand for workers and skills vary from one Member 
State to the other27 while “economic impact of immigration critically depends on 
the skills of residents and the characteristics of the host economy”.28 Instead, the 
Union should “assist Member States in meeting the existing and future labour 
needs” by establishing EU “admission procedures capable of responding promptly 
to fluctuating demands for migrant labor in the labor market”29 which would 
                                                                                                                                       
Member States for the purpose of pursuing activities as self-employed persons, OJ C 27 [1996] 0003 
– 0009. 
22 The Hague Programme (13.12.2004) Council 16054 [2004] 10. 
23 European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (24.12.2008) Council 13189 [2008]. 
24 For instance, for Finland see ’Regeringens invandrarpolitiska program’ (19.10.2006) Statsrådets 
principbeslut. 
25 Draft Council Conclusions on ‘Labour Migration and its Development Potential in the Age of 
Mobility’ 19 November 2009, Council document 15823 [2009] 2. 
26 Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities COM(2001) 
386 final, withdrawn COM(2005) 462 final OJ C 64. For a discussion of Member State objections to 
the 2001 Proposal see B. Ryan, ‘The EU and Labor Migration: Regulating Admission or Treatment?’ 
in A. Baldaccini, E. Guild and H. Toner, Whose Freedom, Security and Justice? (Hart Publishing 2007) 
500. 
27 European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (24.12.2008) Council 13189 [2008] 4-5. 
28 M. Ruhs, ‘Economic Research and Labour Immigration Policy’ [2008] 24 3 Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 407. 
29 Hague Programme (13.12.2004) Council 16054 [2004] 10. 
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“improve labour market efficiency” and “prevent skill shortages”.30 EU law, being a 
rather slow instrument that requires time to pass and amend, should therefore 
leave certain provisions open-ended in order to secure rapid adjustments on 
national level.  
 
Recognition of diverging labor needs found expression in the “division of labor” 
between the national and European levels, whereby the admission of economic 
immigrants, at least on the face of it, remains within the powers of each Member 
State,31 while the admission of other immigrants and the rights of migrants once 
admitted are regulated increasingly in EU law. There seems to be a presumption 
that selection of third-country workers is separate and dissimilar from the 
regulation of their rights once admitted. This distinction between admission and 
rights has been criticized as misguided: “legal rules cannot be classified as 
concerning either selection or regulation because every rule concerns both.”32 
Thus, although Member States preserve their powers not to admit economic 
migrants, their capacity to attract third-country workers is inevitably tied to the 
European level.  
 
While Member States emphasize the divergence of their labor market needs, 
studies suggest that the OECD countries increasingly compete to attract 
international migrant workers with the same set of skills.33 Convergence in the 
demand for skills triggers what has been termed a “global race for talent”34 – 
competition between destination countries to attract international migrants with 
high human capital attributes. While there is no common accord as to what 
amounts to “high” professional skills35, it is more accurate to call these migrants 
                                            
30 Blue Card Directive; Council Conclusions (14.12.2007) Council 16616/1 [2007] 5. 
31 Article 79(5) TEU – under this article, however, Member States are only guaranteed power to 
regulate admission of work seekers from outside the Union; secondary EU immigration law, e.g. 
Recital 8 Blue Card Directive and Article 14(3) LONG-TERM RESIDENCE Directive, recognizes 
national powers to restrict admission of all economic migrants. Stockholm Programme (02.12.2009) 
Council 17024 [2009] 63; European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (24.12.2008) Council 13189 
[2008] 5. 
32 A.C. Cox, ‘Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles’ [2008] 157 2 Univ. of Pennsylvania L. Rev.  
33 D. Guellec and M. Cervantes, ‘International Mobility of Highly Skilled Workers: From Statistical 
Analysis to Policy Formulation, in International Mobility of the Highly Skilled’ [2001] OECD; A. 
Wyckoff and M. Schaaper, ‘The Changing Dynamics of the Global Market for the Highly-Skilled’ 
[2005] OECD www.si.umich.edu/AdvancingKnowledge/drafts/Wyckoff-Version%20Feb%2028%20-
%20Global_HRST_7-Jan_Draft.doc (25.02.2010). 
34 A. Shachar, ‘The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration 
Regimens’ [2006] [2006] 18  NY Univ. L. Rev.  
35 The issue has been disputed both in Council and European Parliament during the adoption of 
Blue Card Directive, see Working Party on Migration and Expulsion (4.4.2008) 8249 [2008]  13; 
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“wanted” in order to reflect the mismatch between their supply and demand. The 
scarcity in the supply of “wanted” immigrants relative to the overall immigration 
flow36 coupled with the shortage of workers in high-skill occupations in the OECD 
countries37 create an excess demand, which builds up competitive pressure on the 
destination countries and changes the rationale behind immigration law.38 It is not 
about restricting immigration of the highly-skilled, but about attracting this type of 
migrant. 
 
Global competition for the highly skilled is vividly reflected in EU immigration 
policy. The Lisbon Strategy set a “new strategic goal” for the EU: “to become the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”.39 This 
marked an official entry of the EU into the competition for the best and the 
brightest. The Hague Program recognized the importance of legal immigration “in 
enhancing the knowledge-based economy in Europe, in advancing economic 
development, and thus contributing to the implementation of the Lisbon 
strategy”.40 The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum fine tuned this objective: 
it is necessary to “increase the attractiveness of the European Union for highly 
qualified workers”.41 The EU acknowledged that it must take into account “the fact 
that the main world regions are already competing to attract migrants to meet the 
needs of their economies.”42  Member States thus aspire to compete with the 
traditional immigration countries for migrant workers with high human capital 
attributes.43 Competition with the United States as regards both attraction and 
retention of skilled workers44 plays a prominent role in the formation of EU 
                                                                                                                                       
summary of the meeting of the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament (5.5.2008) 9259 [2008] 
4. 
36 T. Liebig, ‘Migration Theory from a Supply-Side Perspective’ [2003] 92 Discussion Paper, 
Research Institute for Labour Economics and Labour Law, 
www.faa.unisg.ch/publikationen/diskussionspapiere/dp92.PDF (25.02.2010) 
37 M. Doudeijns and J.-C. Dumont, ‘Immigration and Labor Shortages: Evaluation of Needs and 
Limits of the Selection Policies in the Recruitment of Foreign Labor’ [2003] OECD. 
38 M. Ruhs and P. Martin, ‘Numbers vs. Rights: Trade-Offs and Guest Worker Programs’ [2008] 42  
1 IMR; A. Shachar, ‘The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration 
Regimens’ [2006] [2006] 18  NY Univ. L. Rev. 
39 Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, 23-24 March 2000. 
40 The Hague Programme (13.12.2004) Council 16054 [2004] 10. 
41 European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (24.12.2008) Council 13189 [2008] 5. 
42 Green Paper on an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration [2005] COM(2004) 811 final 4. 
43 Policy Plan on Legal Migration [2005] COM(2005) 669 final. 
44 W. Geis, S. Uebelmesser, M. Werding, ‘Why go to France or Germany, if you could as well go to 
the UK or the US? Selective Features of Immigration to four major OECD Countries’ [2008] 2427 
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immigration policy.45 The necessity to attract skilled third-country workers has 
been reflected in the proposals for EU immigration directives46 and in the text of 
the directives themselves.47  
 
More subtle objectives, however, can be more revealing about the nature of the 
EU’s stance in competition for the highly-skilled. One such objective is “to 
establish a level playing field within the EU”.48 Beyond elimination of competition 
between Union citizens and third-country workers resulting from unequal rights, 
the “level playing field” concerns elimination of competition between Member States49, 
which might result from national immigration schemes favoring “wanted” 
workers.50 An example of this reasoning is found in the Commission’s proposal for 
the Blue Card Directive, which states that in a situation where each Member State 
has different national entry and residence conditions for highly-qualified workers, 
national systems are bound to be in competition, which weakens the attractiveness 
of the EU as a whole and distorts third-country workers’ migration choices; this, 
according to the Commission, triggers the need for a common EU admission 
                                                                                                                                       
CESIFO Working Paper. Skilled immigrants from third countries coming to the United States for 
work often transit through another European country, see A. Takenaka, ‘Secondary Migration: 
Who Re-Migrates and Why These Migrants Matter, Migration Policy Institute’ 26.04.2007, 
www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/print.cfm?ID=597. See also D. J. DeVoretz and J. Ma, 
‘Triangular Human Capital Flows between Sending, Entrepot and the Rest of the World Regions’ 
[2002] www.iza.org (20.10.2008). IT specialists who entered Germany under its “green card” scheme 
stayed only long enough to cultivate a job offer in the United States, see D. G. Papademetriou and 
K. O’Neil, ‘Efficient Practices for the Selection of Economic Migrants’ [2004] Migration Research 
Group for the European Commission. Third-country students studying in the EU tend to stay more 
on a temporary basis than those studying in the United States, see ‘International Mobility of the 
Highly Skilled’ OECD Policy Brief, July 2002 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/20/1950028.pdf 
(20.10.2008). 
45 In connection with the Blue Card Proposal, Commissioner Frattini alleged that while the US 
attracts 55% of all skilled migrants worldwide, the EU attracts only one eleventh that number, see 
European Commission SPEECH/07/526, Lisbon, 13.09.2007. 
46 E.g. Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, 23 
October 2007, COM(2007) 637 final 2.  
47 Recital 6 Student Directive, Recital 17 Research Directive, Recital 7 BC Directive. 
48 Proposal for a Council Directive on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-
country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of 
rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State, COM(2007) 638 final. 
49 Commission Communication on immigration, integration and employment, COM (2003) 336 final 16. 
50 E.g. the UK points system, German green card, preferential treatment accorded to highly skilled 
immigrants in Sweden and the Netherlands. A. Shachar, ‘The Race for Talent: Highly-Skilled 
Migrants and Competitive Immigration Regimes’ 187; R. Cholewinski, ‘The Legal Status of 
Migrations Admitted for Employment’ [2004] 44; S. Mahroum, ‘Europe and the Immigration of 
Highly Skilled Labour’ [2001] 39 5 International Migration. 
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system.51 The UK House of Commons pointed out a tension between this objective, 
the objective of matching immigration flow to the labor market needs of individual 
Member States, and the objective of protecting rights of third-country nationals.52 
While enhanced incentives by one destination may “undermine the effectiveness 
of the managed-migration policies” of another destination,53 competing 
destinations are forced to match each other’s immigration rules, leading to 
convergence of their immigration policies in the long run,54 making EU regulation 
unnecessary. When competition between Member States is artificially reduced, the 
total competitive pressure on individual Member States falls, leading to a longer 
period of adjustment of national immigration policy to global competitive 
realities.55 The situation would be different only if elimination of competition 
between Member States would be accompanied by unification of Europe into a 
single destination for “wanted” international migrants.  
2.4 Objective 3: Temporary Labor Immigration 
 
Another subtle objective of EU immigration policy is its temporary nature. 
Temporary labor immigration is a pragmatic approach, which should increase the 
responsiveness of skill composition of immigration flow to ever shorter cycles of 
the demand for skills,56 offer an alternative to illegal immigration,57 reduce the 
                                            
51 Proposal for Blue Card Directive, COM(2007) 637 final 7. The objective of elimination of 
competition between Member States is contrary, in its conception, to the logic of the internal 
market and could be challenged on economics grounds. As global race for talent leads to “non-
cooperative action taken by fiercely competitive jurisdictions”, the countries seek to emulate and 
exceed their rivals’ immigration offer, leading to “a significant policy convergence among rival 
economies”.  Thus, competition will actually result in convergence rather than differentiation, 
which would annihilate the need for EU-level regulation. See A. Shachar, ‘The Race for Talent: 
Highly-Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration Regimes’ [2006] 18 NY Univ. L. Rev. 156-157. 
52 UK House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee hearing 13.10.2010, record available at 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmeuleg/428-iii/428iii12.htm (last accessed 
07.09.2011). 
53 A. Shachar, ‘The Race for Talent: Highly-Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration 
Regimes’ [2006] 18 NY Univ. L. Rev. 166. 
54 N. T. Duncan, ‘International Labor Competition: Explaining the Timing of Immigration Policy 
Convergence’ Paper presented at the MPSA Annual National Conference (Apr 03, 2008) 
www.allacademic.com/meta/p268242_index.html (23.02.2010). 
55 This has been argued even in international setting, see C. Dauvergne, Sovereignty, ‘Migration and 
the Rule of Law in Global Times’ [2004] 67 4 Modern L.Rev. 603–604. 
56 C. Dustmann, ‘Immigrants and the Labour Market’ [2008] 16 4 European Review 505. 
57 Article 79 TFEU; on the link between temporary legal immigration and the fight against illegal 
immigration see e.g. Council Conclusions (21/22.06.2007) Council 11177/1 [2007] 4 17; ‘A Common 
Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, actions and tools’ COM(2008) 359 final 7. 
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integration and other costs resulting from settlement migrants. The link is based 
on two premises. First, it is submitted that giving illegal immigrants an option to 
come and work in the EU legally, albeit on a temporary basis, would remove the 
necessity of illegal migration. Second, the possibility of multiple entries to the EU 
and of return home without losing the rights acquired from work and residence in 
Europe would reduce the incentives for staying in the EU, both legally and 
illegally. These two components are expressed in two corresponding instruments: 
(1) mobility partnerships between the interested Member States and third 
countries and (2) circular migration approach to EU immigration law. 
 
Mobility partnership is an instrument of external policy, whereby interested 
Member States offer concessions to one or more third countries for short-term 
admission of third-country workers flanked by an agreement on readmission and a 
monitoring mechanism to ensure the temporary character of migration.58 Return to 
the country of origin is the default, while the duration of residence at destination is 
typically less than a year. Competence of the EU in mobility partnerships is limited 
to coordination and facilitation, with no legislative powers. Due to the lack of EU 
regulatory powers in this field, mobility partnerships will not be discussed here 
further. 
 
Circular migration can be characterized as an approach to EU immigration law, 
which avoids penalizing third-country nationals for absences due to return to their 
countries of origin in order to study and work there. Specific clauses to this effect 
are inserted into LTR and Blue Card Directives.59 These clauses are often said to 
promote development of the countries of origin, which is a rather feeble claim 
considering that “countries of origin” include such developed nations as the USA 
and Japan. On the other hand, no provision is made to facilitate absences due to 
employment in developing countries other than the country of origin of the 
migrant. A more accurate vision appears to be that of the Commission, which sees 
circular migration as a legislative framework that aims to promote temporary 
immigration over permanent settlement.60 It is thus an approach valid for all types 
of legal immigration. 
                                            
58 Mobility partnerships have been concluded with Moldova and Cap Verde. For an overview see R. 
Parkes, ‘EU Mobility Partnerships: A Model of Policy Coordination?’ [2009] 11 E. J. of Migration 
and L. 327-345. 
59 LONG-TERM RESIDENCE Directive contains an optional derogation for absence rules, to be 
implemented at the discretion of Member States; this derogation was conceived to accommodate 
mobility between the EU and country of origin, see Proposal for Long-Term Residence Directive 
COM(2001) 127 final 17. Article 16(5) Blue Card Directive specifically provides for such derogation. 
60 M. Cremona,’ Circular Migration: a legal perspective’ 30 CARIM Analytic and Synthetic Notes 
(2008) 1, citing the Commission’s ‘Communication on circular migration and mobility partnerships’ 
COM(2007) 248 final. 
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2.5 Objective 4: Fair Treatment 
 
Initially, the fair treatment objective was conceived from the benefit-conferring 
and individual-empowering angle to secure non-discrimination in economic, social 
and cultural life, access to employment and, as a collateral policy, measures against 
racism and xenophobia.61 While temporary character of immigration aims to avoid 
the costs associated with settlement, fair treatment of immigrants inevitably 
implies incurring these costs. This conflict finds expression in the integration – fair 
treatment nexus,62 whereby granting non-discrimination rights is implicitly tied to 
the “reasonable prospects of permanent residence”63 and the condition of having 
integrated into the host state.64 The nexus between integration and fair treatment 
leaves a logical gap for third-country workers, who ab initio are perceived as 
temporary migrants. Unwillingness to secure rights even for “wanted” immigrant 
workers is traceable in the adoption of Blue Card Directive.65 
 
The idea that economic migrants are somehow less in need of being integrated in 
the host Member State because they will one day leave is not new. This has been 
the case in Germany and other European countries in the second half of the past 
century and lead to disastrous consequences that spread across generations. The 
current situation in the EU is different: it is no longer the low-skilled who are 
supposed to circulate between Europe and third-countries, but highly-skilled 
workers who can, it is submitted, choose where to migrate. In the context of this 
selective policy goal, openness of the receiving labor market and fight against 
discrimination are the determining factors for success of selective immigration 
policy.66 Xenophobia and discrimination create a “disadvantaged reception 
context” that dissuades potential migrants67 and acts as a push factor forcing 
                                            
61 Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions (15 - 16.10.1999) SN 200/99. 
62 European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, Recital 12 LONG-TERM RESIDENCE Directive. 
63 Wording borrowed from FR Directive but the idea is linked to the substance of LONG-TERM 
RESIDENCE Directive: see the section on substance of non-discrimination rights. 
64 Articles 5(2) and 15(3) Long-Term Residence Directive, Articles 4(1) last indent and 7(2) Family 
Reunification Directive. 
65 S. Peers, ‘Attracting and Deterring Labour Migration: The Blue Card and Employer Sanctions 
Directives’ [2009] 11 E. J. of Migration and L. 387-426. 
66 J. Doomernik, R. Koslowski, J. Laurence, R. Maxwell, I. Michalowski, D. Thränhardt, ‘No 
Shortcuts: Selective Migration and Integration’ [2009] Transatlantic Academy Report 14-15, 
www.transatlanticacademy.org. 
67 R. Iredale, ‘The Migration of Professionals: Theories and Typologies’ [2001] 39 5 International 
Migration 19. 
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immigrants to leave Europe.68 Importance of the level of rights of migrants 
increases together with their skill:69 discrimination, both in employment and other 
spheres, is progressively a larger deterrent for highly-skilled than for low-skilled 
workers.70 As person’s income rises above the minimum level, her relative status 
becomes more important, as the determinant of human happiness, than even the 
absolute value of income.71 This suggests that the degree of deterrence remains 
unaltered with the change in the value of the loss caused by discrimination; rather, 
the occurrence of discrimination as such plays a key role. Where rights of 
immigrants are restricted, an economic case can be made for selectivity in the 
restriction of rights, with lower restriction levels associated with “wanted” 
immigrants.72 
3. Substance of EU Immigration Law 
 
The previous section has outlined the policy choice of EU immigration law: legal 
immigration should match the demand for workers in national labor markets with 
preference to the highly-skilled who should come to Europe temporarily and be 
guaranteed rights on a level that is considered “fair” both to them and to EU-
national workers. This section focuses on how EU immigration law achieves these 
policy objectives. Four directives will be examined: Directive 2005/72/EC on the 
admission of researchers (Research Directive), Directive 2009/50/EC on the 
admission of highly qualified workers (Blue Card Directive), Directive 2003/86/EC 
on family reunification of third-country nationals (Family Reunification Directive) 
and Directive 2003/109/EC on the status of long-term residents (Long-Term 
Residence Directive). These directives regulate immigration tot he EU for work, 
tackle specifically highly-skilled immigrants and produce cumulative effects that 
are bound to influence the attainment of the CIP objectives. 
                                            
68 MIREM data on return of Maghrebi immigrants from the EU and J.-P. Cassarino (ed.) ‘Return 
Migrants to the Maghreb: Reintegration and Development Challenges’ [2008] RSCAS/EUI 
http://www.mirem.eu/. 
69 J. Doomernik, R. Koslowski, J. Laurence, R. Maxwell, I. Michalowski, D. Thränhardt, ‘No 
Shortcuts: Selective Migration and Integration’ [2009] Transatlantic Academy Report, 
www.transatlanticacademy.org. 
70 T. Liebig, ‘Migration Theory from a Supply-Side Perspective’ [2003] 92 Discussion Paper 
Research Institute for Labour Economics and Labour Law, 
http://www.faa.unisg.ch/publikationen/diskussionspapiere/dp92.PDF (20.10.2008). 
71 Ö. B . Bodvarsson and H. Van den Berg, The Economics of Immigration (Springer 2009) 49. 
72 M. Ruhs, ‘Economic Research and Labour Immigration Policy’ [2008] 24 3 Oxford Review of 
Economic 414. 
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3.1 State Management of Migration 
 
Economic models of immigration are based on the assumption that people migrate 
in order to maximize the utility and return on their human capital.73 According to 
the human capital theory, immigration is a form of investment whereby workers seek 
to maximize their lifetime earnings.74 For immigration to take place, the value of 
the opportunity available abroad must exceed the value of the opportunity 
available at home plus the costs of moving.75 The costs of immigration include, but 
are not limited to, the foregone earnings, the direct costs of migration, the burden 
of bureaucratic procedures, as well as the non-monetary costs of adjustment to a 
new environment. Immigration law can raise or lower these costs by regulating the 
conditions for lawful residence and admission. The value of the opportunity 
depends on the wage level and employment options in the destination country, the 
length of stay, and the predictability of the outcomes of migration. Immigration 
law can affect these factors by regulating access to work, security of residence, the 
duration of stay, and the legal protection of the rights of migrants. An increase in 
immigration costs or decrease in the expected earnings at the destination reduce 
the overall volume of immigration without altering the skill composition of 
immigration flow.76  However, when immigration costs or immigration earnings 
vary across workers who differ in their skills, the composition of immigration flow 
might change.77 Increased immigration costs or lower rate of returns for one group 
of workers may lead to their negative self-selection and a drop of the share of these 
immigrants relative to the other immigrant groups. The opposite would occur 
                                            
73 Not necessarily only in monetary terms but also in terms of the overall satisfaction, happiness and 
standard of living: people optimize for the “best life” they can get, where the “best” is defined by 
the individual in comparative terms, depending on her group of reference; what is “best” will vary 
throughout the individual’s lifetime but the optimizing behavior is presumed to persist. In addition 
to pull factors in the destination country, it is important to acknowledge the role of the push factors 
in the countries of origin e.g. the desire to diversify risks resulting from instability in the country of 
origin, when the family sends some of its members to work abroad. 
74 G. J. Borjas, Labor Economics (McGraw-Hill 2005) 314 - 351. 
75 This theory has been developed by Sjaastad. For an overview see Ö. B. Bodvarsson and H. Van 
den Berg, The Economics of Immigration (Springer 2009) Ch. 2. 
76 G. J. Borjas, Labor Economics (2005) 338; D. Chiquiar and G. H. Hanson, ‘International Migration, 
Self-Selection, and the Distribution of Wages: Evidence from Mexico and the United States’ [2002] 
59 Working Paper The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, San 
Diego www.ccis-ucsd.org/publications/wrkg59.pdf. 
77 D. Chiquiar and G. H. Hanson, ‘International Migration, Self-Selection, and the Distribution of 
Wages: Evidence from Mexico and the United States’ [2002] 59 Working Paper The Center for 
Comparative Immigration Studies, UC San Diego www.ccis-ucsd.org/publications/wrkg59.pdf ; J. 
Grogger and G. H. Hanson, ‘Income Maximization and the Sorting of Emigrants across 
Destinations’ (2007) www.princeton.edu/~ies/Spring07/HansonPaper.pdf 2. 
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should a particular group of workers receive a preferential treatment that lowers 
their costs or increases earnings. The pattern of destination choices made by 
individual immigrants based on the cost-benefit analysis is called the self-selection 
of immigrants. 
 
Because the costs and benefits of immigration include but are not limited to the 
factors controlled by immigration law,78 immigrant self-selection happens even in 
the absence of pro-active immigration policy. The closure of Europe to economic 
immigrants between the oil crisis and the Amsterdam Treaty, characterized by 
restrictions on economic immigration, resulted not in the absence of immigrant 
selectivity but in the reinforcement of self-selection patters that favored first of all 
low-skilled settlers.79 Restrictive immigration policy adds to the overall costs of 
immigration, reducing the rates of return on immigration and thus reducing 
attractiveness of the destination country.80 Non-economic immigration channels 
coupled with the limited employment opportunities in Europe led to a strong path 
dependency81 and de-selection of economic migrants in favor of humanitarian and 
                                            
78 For instance, networks reduce immigration costs through active assistance to the newly arrived, 
provision of information, and facilitating adjustment; network effects become stronger over time 
and may be self-enforcing, see W. Geis, S. Uebelmesser and M. Werding, ‘Why Go to France or 
Germany, if You Could Go As Well to the UK or the US? Selective Features of Immigration in 
Four Major OECD Countries’ [2008] 2427 CESIFO Working Paper  www.cesifo-group.org/wp. 
79 I. Kogan, Working through Barriers. Host Country Institutions and Immigrant Labor Market 
Performance in Europe (Springer 2007). Ireland and the UK are an exception to this trend, see A. 
Turmann, ‘A New European Agenda for Labor Mobility’ [2004] CEPS, Brussels. Non-economic 
migrants have been accused of being “less active in the labour market and exhibit lower earnings” 
than immigrants admitted for work, see A. Constant and K.F. Zimmermann, ‘Immigrant 
Performance and Selective Immigration Policy: a European Perspective’ [2005] 195 National 
Institute Economic Review 94-96; B. R. Chiswick, ‘Are Immigrants Favorably Self-Selected?’ 
Available at www.rau.ro/intranet/Aer/1999/8902/89020181.pdf 181. Studies based on US data 
suggest that family-based immigration may weaken the selective immigration policies aimed at 
achieving a bias towards the highly-skilled, see W. Geis, S. Uebelmesser and M. Werding, ‘Why Go 
to France or Germany, if You Could Go As Well to the UK or the US? Selective Features of 
Immigration in Four Major OECD Countries’ [2008] 2427 CESIFO Working Paper  www.cesifo-
group.org/wp; B. R. Chiswick, ‘Are Immigrants Favorably Self-Selected?’ Available at 
www.rau.ro/intranet/Aer/1999/8902/89020181.pdf 183; A.C. Cox, ‘Immigration Law’s Organizing 
Principles’ [2008] 157 2 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 383. Other studies suggest that self-
selectivity of family migrants depends also on factors beyond immigration rules, see J. Doomernik, 
R. Koslowski, J. Laurence, R. Maxwell, I. Michalowski, D. Thränhardt, ‘No Shortcuts: Selective 
Migration and Integration’ [2009] www.transatlanticacademy.org (01.02.2010). 
80 The so-called Clark, Hatton and Williamson model, see Ö. B. Bodvarsson and H. Van den Berg, 
The Economics of Immigration (Springer 2009) 48. 
81 One of the factors contributing to path dependency is the availability of immigrant networks, 
which tend to reinforce existing skill composition of immigration flow, see R. Iredale, ‘The Need to 
Import Skilled Personnel: Factors Favouring and Hindering its International Mobility’ [1999] 37 1 
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family reunification channels.82 The challenge of the European immigration policy 
today is to turn the tide by opening the channels, lowering the costs and increasing 
the benefits for “wanted” third-country workers. 
3.2 Selection, Differentiation or Discrimination? 
 
EU law prohibits discrimination on the grounds of nationality as regards nationals 
of the Member States.83 This, however, is not the case for third-country nationals. 
First, third-country nationals may be treated differently as between themselves 
depending on their nationality. A number of external agreements of the EU with 
third countries secure for nationals of these countries equal treatment rights in 
various areas, e.g. conditions of employment including remuneration and 
dismissal,84 social security,85 and the right to continue employment and residence 
in the host Member State.86 Second, there is no general prohibition of 
discrimination of third-country nationals vis-à-vis nationals of Member States. 
General non-discrimination law adopted by the EU is applicable to third-country 
nationals but discrimination on the grounds of nationality remains excluded from 
its scope.87 Quite on the contrary, equal treatment with nationals of the host 
Member State is granted to third-country nationals in deviation from the general 
unequal treatment presumption. Differential treatment of foreign nationals serves 
                                                                                                                                       
International Migration 94. Other authors mention regional disparities in prosperity among the 
drivers of migration: K. F Zimmermann, ‘European Labor Mobility: Challenges and Potentials’ 
[2005] 4 De Economist 153. 
82 G. Orcalli, ‘Constitutional choice and European immigration policy’ [2007] 18 Constit Polit Econ 
15. Those who could enter under the no-immigrant-worker policies were humanitarian immigrants 
and family members of the low-skilled workers already settled in Europe. 
83 Article 18 TFEU. 
84 Partnership and Cooperation Agreements : 1999 Armenia Article 20; 1999 Azerbaijan Article 20; 
1999 Georgia Article 20; 1999 Kazakhstan Article 19; 1999 Kyrgyz Republic Article 19; 1998 Moldova 
Article 23; 1996 Russia Article 23(1); 1998 Ukraine Article 24; 1999 Uzbekistan Article 19; 2005 
Stabilization and Association Agreement with Croatia Article 45; 2004 Agreement with Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia Article 44. 
85 Euro-Mediterranean Agreements: 2005 Algeria Article 67; 2000 Morocco Article 64; 1998 Tunisia 
Article 64. 
86 EEC-Turkey Association Agreement (1963) Additional Protocol Article 37, Decisions 1/80 and 
3/80 of EEC-Turkey Association Council. 
87 E.g. Article 3(2) Race Directive 2004/43/EC and Article 3(2) Framework Directive 2000/78/EC. For 
further analysis see A. Wiesbrock, Legal Migration to the European Union. Ten Years after Tampere 
(Wolf Publishers 2009). 
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as a tool in external relations of the Union and its Member States by allowing them 
to offer privileged treatment in exchange for other concessions.88 
 
In the CIP, differential treatment of migrants is the key to influencing the skill 
composition of immigration flow. At the first glance, the structure of EU 
immigration law is coherent with the overall policy objective of attracting skilled 
migrants in that there are two types of directives: vertical directives on admission, 
which differentiate between the different professional groups of migrants 
(Students, Research and Blue Card Directives, 2004/114/EC, 2005/72/EC and 
2009/50/EC accordingly), and horizontal directives on the rights of migrants, 
applicable across the different groups (Family Reunification and Long-Term 
Residence Directives, 2003/86/EC and 2003/109/EC accordingly).89 Both types of 
instrument regulate the rights of third-country workers and thus produce 
cumulative effects that vary from one group to another.  
 
The problem, however, arises with the definition of these migrant groups. In other 
words, do the groups that form the basis for differentiation reflect the professional 
skills of migrants? The answer to this question is “not necessarily”. This is so 
because rights in EU immigration law attach to immigration status (the label on the 
residence permit, e.g. “Blue Card holder” or “researcher”), which is the function of 
the motives for first admission into the Union (in order to study, join family 
members, undertake research, seasonal or highly-qualified employment, etc), while 
subsequent switching between the statuses is not always possible.90 Differentiation 
in the admission directives is not linked to the skills of workers per se: a highly-
skilled third-country national who is a family member of Union citizen, for 
example, will likely opt for admission as a family member rather than the complex 
                                            
88 For example, offering visa facilitations in return for readmission obligations for third states, e.g. 
Council Decision 2007/340/EC of 19 April 2007 on the conclusion of the Agreement between the 
European Community and the Russian Federation on the facilitation of issuance of short-stay visas 
and Council Decision 2007/341/EC of 19 April 2007 on the conclusion of the Agreement between 
the European Community and the Russian Federation on readmission, both agreements concluded 
together and entering into force simultaneously. 
89 Students Directive 2004/114/EC is left out from the analysis as it is not directly concerned with 
economic migration and does not give a right to remain and work upon the completion of studies. 
Proposal on a single work and residence permit (COM(2007) 638 final) is currently pending Council 
negotiations. 
90 A requirement to apply for status prior to admission and from outside the territory of the 
Member State is contained in Article 3(1) of Research Directive, Blue Card Directive and Students 
Directives. However, Member States may allow applications for EU Blue Card once already in the 
country, Article 10 Blue Card Directive. 
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admission and certification procedure under the Blue Card Directive.91 If not all 
highly-skilled immigrants are admitted under the Blue Card Directive,92 not all the 
highly-skilled will benefit from the facilitations contained therein. This is in sharp 
contrast with the approach adopted in EU free movement law, where the rights of 
“wanted” migrants (in this case EU national workers) arise as a direct consequence 
of their economic activity and independently of the initial reason for their 
migration.93 Impossibility of switching based on actual employment and 
impossibility to accumulate rights under the different immigration statuses for 
which the same individual could be eligible, add rigidity to the system and nullify 
facilitations aimed at the highly-skilled. In order to promote skilled migration and 
discourage brain waste, switching and upgrading of status should be allowed for 
lawfully resident third-country workers who engage in skilled work independently 
of their initial motives for entry into the Union. Tying the rights of migrant 
workers to their actual employment (rather than to their immigration status in law) 
would give a clear incentive to engage in skilled work. 
 
The rights directives, on the other hand, apply across the different migrant groups, 
allowing third-country workers to upgrade their rights subsequently to the first 
entry into the Union, tying this upgrade directly to the stability of residence in the 
host Member State. To understand the influence of these directives on the 
composition of immigration flow, we need to answer whether the “wanted” groups 
of third-country nationals benefit from these directives more (or at least no less) 
than third-country nationals generally. This question is addressed below. 
3.3 Decreasing Costs: Admission Procedures 
 
EU immigration policy links admission of third-country workers to the availability 
of open vacancies in specified employment sectors,94 with a protective preference 
secured for EU labor force.95 Research and Blue Card Directives are coherent with 
                                            
91 No accumulation of rights under the different immigration status to which the same individual 
may be entitled is possible under EU immigration law, see for instance Article 3(2)(e) Blue Card 
Directive. A family member of Union citizen will thus have to choose whether to benefit form EU 
free movement law but remain dependent on his/her spouse as the source of rights or undergo 
much more cumbersome admission procedures in order to gain independent rights. 
92 Blue Card Directive also allows parallel national schemes, Article 3(4). 
93 E.g. Cases C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-04921,C-292/89 Antonissen [1991] ECR I-00745, 53/81 
Levin [1982] ECR 01035, 48/75 Royer [1976] ECR 497; 157/79 Pieck ECR [1980] 02171; 118/75 Watson 
and Belmam [1976] ECR 118; C-363/89 Roux [1991] ECR I-273; C-459/99 MRAX [2002] ECR I-6591. 
94 Policy Plan on Legal Migration COM(2005) 669. 
95 Articles 11(3)(a) and 14(3) Long-Term Residence Directive, 8(2) BC Directive. 
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this approach: both include a mechanism of employer authorizations and quotas 
that allows each Member State to refuse admission of economic immigrants; this is 
a de facto opt-out available to the Member States from application of the 
Directives.96 Those Member States that set their admission quotas and employer 
authorizations above zero, may subject admission of third-country workers into 
their territories and labor markets to the so-called “labor market test”,97 which for 
the holders of EU Blue Card may be made anew on each renewal.98 To allow 
adjustments to the divergent and constantly changing needs of the national labor 
markets, many provisions relating to the acquisition and retention of residence 
rights remain undefined on Union level, causing variations from one Member State 
to the other, in particular financial requirements and salary thresholds,99 
conditions for the loss of status,100 and access to the labor market.101 EU and 
national residence permits may lead parallel co-existence and Member States may 
issue either to economic migrants.102 While the intention is clearly to ensure a 
match between immigrant workers and the local demand for labor, avoiding 
rigidity that could result from fixing the rules at the Union level, for highly-skilled 
third-country workers such variations between Member States create uncertainty, 
making immigration to the EU less attractive. 
 
According to the human capital theory, the choice of whether and where to move 
depends on the ability of the migrant to predict the value of immigration option, in 
                                            
96 A direct opt-out from EU immigration law is exercised by the UK, Ireland and Denmark. 
97 Article 8(2) Blue Card Directive, Article 14(2) Family Reunification Directive, Article 14(3) Long-
Term Residence Directive as regards admission of long-term residents for employment from one 
Member State to another; Research Directive does not regulate access to the labor market outside 
the pre-approved research project with pre-approved employer. 
98 Articles 8(2) and 12(2) BC Directive. 
99 Articles 4(2)a and 7(3-6) Blue Card Directive, Article 6(2)b Research Directive, Articles 5(1)a, 7(1) 
and 15(2)a Long-Term Residence Directive, Article 7(1)c Family Reunification Directive. 
100 Due, inter alia, to non-compliance with the financial and other variable conditions on the 
renewal of permit. In some cases, divergences arise also due to variations in national 
implementation: for instance, although Article 9 Long-Term Residence Directive contains 
mandatory conditions for the loss of status, Finnish law implementing of this directive allows for 
longer periods of absence without the los of status, §58 Utlänningslag 30.4.2004/301. 
101 Research Directive does not specify whether researchers may engage in economic activities other 
than research and teaching, while its Article 4(2) allows Member States adopt more favorable 
provisions, presumable including on access to work. Article 12 Blue Card Directive on access to 
economic activities leaves scope for significant variations between Member States. According to 
Article 14 Family Reunification Directive, access to employment for family members follows the 
national deviations for the main migrant and allows additional national variations under Article 
14(2). 
102 Article 13 Long-Term Residence Directive. 
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other words the total earnings from immigration, which is a function of the 
duration of stay, the rights of migrants, and the wage differential compared to the 
alternative destinations (including staying at home). Scarcity of any of these 
factors, e.g. wage differential that in Europe is lower than in the US,103 can be 
compensated by the other factors, such as the duration of stay, stronger protection 
of the rights of migrants, and overall clarity of immigration rules. Inability to 
forecast future earnings at destination creates a potential cost for migrants and 
could act as a deterrent, lowering the total volume of immigration, postponing 
migration104, or causing re-migration.105 High degree of uncertainty over 
immigration rules (admission, residence length, rights and treatment) in the host 
state increases migration costs and renders the destination less attractive. In order 
to enhance selectivity, clarity and predictability of immigration rules should be 
progressively increased and harmonized for immigrants with the desired skills. A 
European policy to attract highly-skilled workers requires more boldness if it is to 
affect the actual composition of immigration flow to any perceptible degree. 
3.4 Increasing Benefits: Length of Stay and Security of Residence 
 
If immigration is an investment into the individual’s future, the value of 
immigration option is directly proportional to the length of residence at the 
destination, i.e. the period during which the return on investment is reaped. 
Recent experiences in Europe show that temporary migration schemes are not 
sufficiently attractive for highly-skilled immigrants.106 The pay-off period on 
immigration is reduced for temporary migrants, while home-specific human capital 
                                            
103 One of the non-immigration-law factors that contribute to the self-selection of immigrants with 
lower human capital in Europe than e.g. in the United States is lower income dispersion and more 
progressive social policies in the EU. J. Grogger and G. H. Hanson, ‘Income Maximization and the 
Sorting of Emigrants Across Destinations’ [2007] 
www.princeton.edu/~ies/Spring07/HansonPaper.pdf; G. J. Borjas, ‘The Economics of Immigration’ 
[1994] XXXII Journal of Economic Literature ; Ö. B. Bodvarsson and H. Van den Berg, The 
Economics of Immigration (Springer 2009). 
104 Ö. B . Bodvarsson and H. Van den Berg, The Economics of Immigration (Springer 2009)  50. 
105 MIREM data on return of Maghrebi immigrants from the EU and J.-P. Cassarino (ed) ‘Return 
Migrants to the Maghreb: Reintegration and Development Challenges’ [2008] RSCAS/EUI 
http://www.mirem.eu/. 
106 This was the conclusion of numerous commentators of the original German “green card” scheme 
for IT immigrants. See for instance M. Doudeijns and J.-C. Dumont, ‘Immigration and Labor 
Shortages: Evaluation of Needs and Limits of the Selection Policies in the Recruitment of Foreign 
Labor’ [2003] OECD. 
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valuable in the case of return is depreciated during the stay abroad.107 Temporary 
character of migration may even lead to a negative self-selection and a drop in the 
level of skills because temporary immigrants have fewer incentives to invest in the 
destination-specific human capital.108 
 
Research and Blue Card Directives offer only temporary stay; there is no 
underlying presumption or expectation that the workers will settle, nor is there a 
right to permanent settlement from the day of entry or anytime soon after. In order 
to secure residence and employment rights, third-country nationals must apply for 
the long-term residence permit after having resided continuously in the EU for at 
least five years.109 The likelihood of being able to apply for this permit depends on 
whether the immigrant succeeds in preserving continuous legal residence over a 
five-year period. The combination of restrictions on employment and geographic 
mobility with tying residence rights to constant availability of employment make it 
more difficult for Blue Card holders and researchers to fulfill the residence 
requirement as compared to other third-country nationals.110 This makes those 
who come to the EU for skilled employment comparatively worse off than other 
migrants, because the general rule of the Long-Term Residence Directive only 
requires employment at the time of the application for status and not throughout 
the five preceding years.111 Researchers are in an even worse situation because they 
(1) cannot accumulate periods of residence in different Member States and (2) 
                                            
107 T. Liebig, ‘Migration Theory from a Supply-Side Perspective’ [2003] 92 Discussion Paper 
Research Institute for Labour Economics and Labour Law 
www.faa.unisg.ch/publikationen/diskussionspapiere/dp92.PDF. 
108 B. R. Chiswick, ‘Are Immigrants Favorably Selected? An Economic Analysis’ in C. D. Brettell 
and J. F. Hollifield (eds) Migration Theory: Talking Across the Disciplines (Routledge 2000) 60-61. 
109 The general rule is five years of residence in the same Member State. Blue Card holders may 
accumulate residence periods in different Member States but must reside continuously in the same 
Member State for at least two years immediately prior to the application for the long-term resident 
status (Article 16 Blue Card Directive). Family members of Blue Card holders may still be required 
to accumulate five years of residence within only one Member State (Article 15(7) Blue Card 
Directive). 
110 Articles 7(2), 13(1) and 16 Blue Card Directive and Article 4(1) Long-Term Residence Directive; 
Article 8 Research Directive specifies that residence permits should be valid for at least one year, 
but typically both research and Blue Card permits are valid for less than fie year, and should thus 
be renewed at least once before the worker qualifies for acquisition of long-term residence permit; 
the conditions for admission should be fulfilled on each renewal of permit, Article 9(1)b Blue Card 
Directive and Article 8 Research Directive. 
111 Article 5(1)a Long-Term Residence Directive refers to “stable and regular resources” at the time 
of application for the permit: thus both at the time of application and prior to that the resources 
may come from sources other than work, decoupling legality and continuity of residence from the 
situation in the employment market. This, however, is not so for researchers and Blue Card 
holders, whose permits are linked directly to their employment. 
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could fall outside the scope of the Long-Term Residence Directive altogether 
pursuant to Article 3(2)e.112 
 
EU long-term residence rules may be counterproductive for achieving EU policy 
goals. On the one hand, their very existence undermines the temporary character 
of labor immigration, one of the objectives of EU immigration policy; on the other 
hand, long-term residence rules fail to lower the costs of migration by securing a 
longer period of returns on migration for “wanted” migrants. Despite the weak 
attempts to facilitate acquisition of the long-term resident status for Blue Card 
holders, the combination of various rules clearly favors non-economic migrants. 
While highly-skilled workers are more internationally mobile than their low-skilled 
counterparts,113 for many highly-skilled immigrants, especially those from poorer 
and less stable countries, stability and participation in the host society may be an 
additional non-monetary benefit of migration, which is already offered by the 
traditional destination countries. Europe may lose attractiveness if it fails to match 
the “talent for citizenship exchange” offered elsewhere.114 Treating “wanted” 
migrants as “visitors” makes them “less likely to come in the first place”.115 
3.5 Increasing Benefits: Labor Market Size 
 
Other things being equal, more populous destination countries are more attractive 
for migrants, especially the highly-skilled, because they maximize career choices116 
                                            
112 Member States diverge on this point, see Report from the European Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the 
status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents (28.9.2011) COM(2011) 585 final. 
113 A. Takenaka, ‘Secondary Migration: Who Re-Migrates and Why These Migrants Matter’ [2007] 
Migration Policy Institute www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/print.cfm?ID=597; G. J. Borjas, 
‘Labor Economics’ [2005] 317-319; A. Solimano, ‘The International Mobility of Talent and its 
Impact on Global Development’ 08 UN University Discussion Paper [2006]. Positive correlation 
between education and mobility was also noted in the European context, see A. Turmann, ‘A New 
European Agenda for Labor Mobility’ [2004] CEPS Brussels. 
114 M. Ruhs and P. Martin, ‘Numbers vs. Rights: Trade-Offs and Guest Worker Programs’ [2008] 42 
1 IMR; A. Shachar, ‘The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration 
Regimens’ [2006] [2006] 18  NY Univ. L. Rev. 
115 J. Wickham, ‘A Skilled Migration Policy for Europe? in European Governance of Migration’ 
[2008] www.migration-boell.de (18.01.2010). 
116 A. Shachar, ‘The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration 
Regimens’ [2006] 18 NY Univ. L. Rev. This is consistent with the gravity model of immigration 
developed by Zipf (1946), see Ö. B . Bodvarsson and H. Van den Berg, The Economics of Immigration 
(Springer 2009) 30. See also R. Iredale, ‘The Need to Import Skilled Personnel: Factors Favouring 
and Hindering its International Mobility’ [1999] 37 1 International Migration 90. 
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and offer wider consumption options.117 The size of potential labor market matters 
more for the highly-skilled:118 as workers become more specialized, a limited local 
labor market is less likely to offer sufficient breadth for lifetime career 
development.119 For the highly-skilled, “countries with very specific skills 
requirements are less attractive than those with a more ample demand for skills, as 
future employment perspectives will be more limited in the former.”120 
 
EU law limits employment opportunities of migrants both geographically and by 
type of economic activity. Only long-term residents (independently of their 
profession) have a general right to work in the host Member State. Access to the 
labor market for Blue Card holders and researchers is limited to a specific job with 
a specific employer; switching jobs must be authorized each time, while switching 
to a branch that does not meet the criteria established in the Directives will lead to 
a loss of residence permit.121 The right to change jobs for Blue Card holders is 
circumvented further by tying their residence rights to the continuity of 
employment.122 This reduces attractiveness of the EU as a destination for the 
“wanted” immigrants because workers with high professional qualifications are 
more likely to change jobs and occupations.123 Difficulty in switching between 
various economic activities was one of the reasons for failure of the German “green 
                                            
117 Migration is responsive to availability of amenities and overall quality of life, see Ö. B . 
Bodvarsson and H. Van den Berg, The Economics of Immigration (Springer 2009) 34-36. 
118 T. Bauer and A. Kunze, ‘The Demand for High-Skilled Workers and Immigration Policy’ (Feb. 
2004) 4274 Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper. 
119 G. J. Borjas, Labor Economics (McGraw-Hill 2005) 318. In some highly-skilled careers, there is 
even an expectation of geographic mobility without which career progression is stalled, see S. 
Morano-Foadi, ‘Scientific Mobility, Career Progression, and Excellence in the European Research 
Area1’ [2005] 43 5 International Migration 144. 
120 T. Liebig, ‘Migration Theory from a Supply-Side Perspective’ [2003] 92 Discussion Paper 
Research Institute for Labour Economics and Labour Law 
www.faa.unisg.ch/publikationen/diskussionspapiere/dp92.PDF. 
121 Residence of researchers is tied to a hosting agreement with a particular employer for a 
particular project, Articles 7(1)(b) and 10(1) Research Directive; Articles 9(1) and 12(2) Blue Card 
Directive. 
122 Blue Card permit may be withdrawn if unemployment lasts longer than three consecutive 
months or if it occurs more than once during the validity of Blue Card, see Article 13 Blue Card 
Directive. The European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers obliges France, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands to allow at least five months’ unemployment prior to 
withdrawal of residence permit. 
123 D.G. Papademetriou and K. O’Neil, ‘Selecting Economic Migrants’ in D.G. Papademetriou, 
‘Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century’ [2006] Migration Policy Institute 236. 
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card” scheme.124 “Restricting migrants' employment to specific employers […] is 
likely to have adverse consequences for the employment prospects of resident 
workers and for the efficiency of the labour market[; i]t can encourage employers 
to prefer migrants over resident workers who have free choice of employment”,125 
creating social dumping and undermining the 2020 Strategy goals.126 
 
Geographically, residence and employment permits established in EU law and 
marked “EU” permits are limited to the issuing Member State and do not grant a 
right to work and reside outside its borders.127 Residence and economic activities 
in another Member State must be authorized anew on each relocation. Although 
the Directives contain provisions regulating mobility between Member States, the 
effect of these provisions on mobility is restrictive.128 Even long-term resident 
status, which is supposed to secure residence rights and facilitate mobility, is easily 
lost as a direct consequence of mobility both within the EU and between the EU 
and non-EU countries.129 Blue Card Directive explicitly prohibits mobility in the 
EU during the first 18 months of residence in each Member State; thereafter 
conditions for admission to another Member State equal the conditions for first 
admission into the Union.130 If anything, these provisions increase certainty: there 
                                            
124 H. Werner, ‘The Current “Green Card” Initiative for Foreign IT Specialists in Germany, in 
International mobility of the Highly Skilled’ [2001] OECD. 
125 M. Ruhs, ‘Economic Research and Labour Immigration Policy’ [2008] 24 3 Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 413. 
126 One of them being employment: Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020 A strategy 
for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (3.3.2010) COM(2010) 2020, p. 8. 
127 For all groups of migrants, the second Member State must grant a permit to reside in order to 
move within the Union: Article 19 Long-Term Residence Directive, Article 18 Blue Card Directive, 
Article 13 Research Directive. 
128 A. Kocharov, ‘What Intra-Community Mobility for Third-Country Workers?’ [2008] 6 E.L.Rev. 
913 – 926, S. Iglesias Sanches, ‘Free Movement of Third-Country Nationals in the European 
Union?’ [2009] 15 6 E.L.J. 791–805. 
129 Twelve months of absence from the territory of the Community or six years of absence from the 
issuing Member State trigger a loss of status. Longer absences are permitted for Blue Card holders; 
however, Member States may limit this extension to cases where the absence is due to the exercise 
of economic activities or study in the country of origin (Article 16(4) and (5) Blue Card Directive).  
The status is confined to the issuing Member State and its acquisition ex nuovo in other Member 
States is subject to the same conditions as in the first Member State. A loss of long-term resident 
status in one Member State may lead to withdrawal of or refusal to renew a residence permit in 
another Member State (to which the person has relocated pursuant to Chapter III Long-Term 
Residence Directive) and initiation of removal procedures to a non-EU country even where other 
conditions for residence continue to be met (Article 22(1)b Long-Term Residence Directive). 
Member States, however, must allow facilitated re-acquisition of status to compensate for this 
drawback, though not necessarily re-admit. 
130 Article 18 Blue Card Directive. 
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is no EU-wide labor market.131 Surprisingly, the workers who are supposedly the 
most “wanted” and whose availability should reduce skill shortages in the EU, are 
being penalized by an outright ban on their geographic mobility. This is in line 
with the concealed goal of reducing competition for highly-skilled immigrants 
between Member States. Having established a “level playing field” between 
themselves, Member States remain disadvantaged in the international arena: a 
highly-skilled third-country worker might have only one plausible employer in the 
host Member State due to the structure of its labor market; in a situation where a 
change of employer takes place, either because of a career move or because the job 
is no longer available, a rule facilitating admission and preserving residence status 
in another Member State could induce the migrant to stay in the EU. Without 
such rule, onward migration from the EU becomes more likely. This is especially 
so for Blue Card holders, who might see their residence right withdrawn after 
three months of unemployment in their Member State of residence.132 
 
The mismatch between the connotation of permits as “EU” permits and their 
substance, limited to the issuing Member State, creates a deceptive impression of 
the EU as a single immigrant destination, especially as regards the “Blue Card” 
permit, which was explicitly designed to send a “clear signal” that “highly skilled 
people from all over the world are welcome in the European Union”.133 Obviously, 
creating an “EU” permit with a name reminiscent of the US Green Card is likely to 
“have an effect on the expectations that migrants have regarding their life” in 
Europe,134 in particular as regards both stability and geographical breadth of 
residence and employment rights. This disinformation may lead to suboptimal 
immigration choices resulting from the underestimation of costs and risks, and the 
overestimation of benefits of the “destination Europe”. Having realized their 
mistake, migrants will be more likely to re-migrate to destinations outside 
Europe.135 Immigrants will waste their time and resources, the benefit of having 
attracted them will be short-lived, while the reputation of Europe as destination 
will be undermined. The Blue Card deception could also run counter to Article 3 
                                            
131 A. Skordas, ‘Immigration and the Market: the Long-Term Residence Directive’ [2006] 13 
Columbia J. of E.L. 201. 
132 Article 13 Blue Card Directive. 
133J. M. Barroso, SPEECH/07/650, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference= 
SPEECH/07/650 (18.01.2010). 
134 W. Geis, S. Uebelmesser and M. Werding, ‘Why Go to France or Germany, if You Could Go As 
Well to the UK or the US? Selective Features of Immigration in Four Major OECD Countries’ 
[2008] 2427 CESIFO Working Paper 9 www.cesifo-group.org/wp;  S. Peers, ‘Attracting and 
Deterring Labour Migration: The Blue Card and Employer Sanctions Directives’ [2009] 11 E.J. of 
Migration and L. 410. 
135 Ö.B. Bodvarsson and H. Van den Berg, The Economics of Immigration (Springer 2009) 264 
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of the ILO Convention 97 on Migration for Employment, which obliges its 
signatories – inter alia Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Spain, UK – to “take all appropriate steps against misleading 
propaganda” relating to immigration. 
 
It is regrettable that the Union fails to cash in on one of its greatest potentials. An 
EU-wide labor market is one of the main benefits that EU law could offer to its 
prospective immigrants.136 Occupational and geographic mobility of resident third-
country workers could be a “primary mechanism” for improving labor market 
efficiency137 and enhance the “effective attainment of an internal market”.138 When 
it comes to the exercise of economic activities, the EU seems incapable to translate 
its own policy goals into a binding law that would achieve them. 
3.6 Decreasing Costs: Family Reunification 
 
Inability to live with one’s own family is one of the most immediate non-monetary 
costs of migration. Following the differentiation principle, EU immigration law 
facilitates family reunion for “wanted” third-country nationals. Blue Card holders 
enjoy exemptions from some of the onerous conditions of the Family Reunification 
Directive: the requirements of the “reasonable prospects” of permanent residence, 
the minimal residence period, facilitation of integration requirements where they 
are applied, halved period for evaluation of applications, and immediate access to 
the labor market for family members.139 Family unity of researchers should be 
“facilitated and supported”140 though each Member State “decides to grant a 
residence permit to the family members of a researcher”141 without a binding EU 
standard.142 
 
                                            
136 Y. Schibel, ‘Mobility Rights in Europe’ in R. del Caz, M. Rodríguez and M. Saravia (eds) ‘Report 
of Valladolid. The Right to Mobility’ [2005] www.migpolgroup.com/documents/3183.html; S. 
Mahroum, ‘Europe and the Immigration of Highly Skilled Labour’ [2001] 39 5 International 
Migration. 
137 Recital 15 Blue Card Directive. 
138 Recital 18 Long-Term Residence Directive. 
139 Article 15 Blue Card Directive. 
140 Recital 18 Family Reunification Directive. 
141 Article 9(1) Research Directive. Family reunification of researchers upon their mobility between 
Member States is governed by national law, see Recital 19 Family Reunification Directive. 
142 It is recommended that Member States offer “favorable and attractive conditions and 
procedures” for family reunification of researchers. Point 3 Council Recommendation 2005/762/EC. 
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Exercise of mobility between Member States is much more problematic for family 
unity of third-country workers. Although the Blue Card Directive offers Blue Card 
holders a possibility to accumulate periods of residence in different Member States 
for the purposes of acquisition of long-term residence permit (five years of 
continuous residence), there is no provision for a similar facilitation for their 
accompanying family members. Intra-EU mobility for family members of 
researchers is even more problematic because the Research Directive leaves the 
admission of family members to the discretion of Member States; thus, family 
members may face with different rules on their admission each time their 
researcher spouse moves between Member States. Not only does this create 
uncertainty about migration outcomes, but it may discourage the primary migrant 
from effectuating the move altogether. As an increasing number of spouses are 
themselves career professionals and participate in immigration choices, their 
position becomes equally important to that of the principle migrant.143 
3.7 Increasing Benefits: Labor Market Access for Family Members 
 
Despite facilitated rules for family reunification outlined above, family members of 
researchers and Blue Card holders may find it more difficult, as compared to other 
immigrants, to access the labor market. This is so because Member States may 
restrict access to economic activities for family members of any immigrant group 
“in the same way as the sponsor”.144 Where the sponsor’s work permit is limited to 
one employer or branch, or sets an overall cap on the number of hours she may 
work, this may apply equally to all her family members. Not all family members of 
the highly-skilled migrants will necessarily qualify for employment under the Blue 
Card scheme or under the Research Directive; even those who do possess the 
necessary qualifications may be unable to find employment in the same branch 
due to the labor market structure of the host Member State. Children of Blue Card 
holders may be excluded from the labor market altogether for lack of requisite 
qualifications. Yet, the degree to which family members can compensate for the 
opportunity costs incurred by quitting a job at an alternative destination in order 
to follow the principle migrant has a major impact on destination choice.145 This is 
why countries competing for the “wanted” immigrants increasingly allow spouses 
of the highly-skilled immediate access to their labor market.146 In EU free 
                                            
143 D. Guellec and M. Cervantes, ‘International Mobility of Highly Skilled Workers: From Statistical 
Analysis to Policy Formulation, in International Mobility of the Highly Skilled’ [2001] OECD. 
144 Article 14(1)b Family Reunification Directive. 
145 G. J. Borjas, Labor Economics (McGraw-Hill 2005) 321-327. 
146 This has been the case, for instance, in Australia and Germany, see A. Shachar, ‘The Race for 
Talent: Highly-Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration Regimes’185, 190. 
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movement of workers, liberal family reunification rules are a condition sine qua non 
for ensuring mobility of EU nationals.147 Fortunately, the rules on access to work 
for family members of third-country workers are only minimum standards, not 
followed by all Member States.148 It is nevertheless surprising that EU immigration 
law sets such low a standard that the objectives of EU immigration policy come in 
peril and must be rescued by non-application of what EU law allows. 
3.8 Decreasing Costs: Rights Protection 
 
It has long been recognized in EU free movement law that the protection of the 
rights of migrant workers plays a key role in their ability and willingness to 
migrate. The ECJ has developed the doctrines of direct effect, effet utile, and state 
responsibility in order to ensure the protection of the individual’s rights in EU 
law.149 Third-country nationals benefit from these principles when they derive 
rights from Union-citizen family members150 or EU service providers.151 These 
doctrines have equally been extended to the provisions of mixed external 
agreements with third-countries where these provisions regulate the rights of 
migrant workers.152 While a detailed discussion of all these instruments would go 
beyond the scope of this work,153 it is important to note here that third-country 
                                            
147 E.g. cases C-370/90 Singh (1992) ECR I-04265, C-60/00 Carpenter (2002) ECR I-06279, C-127/08 
Metock (2008) ECR I-06241. 
148 K. Groenendijk, R. Fernhout, D. van Dam, R. van Oers, T. Strik, ‘The Family Reunification 
Directive in EU Member States the First Year of Implementation’ [2007] Centre for Migration Law 
Nijmegen. 
149 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL, Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos, Case C-6&9/90 Frankovich. 
150 Case C-127/08 Metock (2008) ECR I-06241; Case C-34/09 Zambrano; Article 24(1) Directive 
2004/38/EC. 
151 Case C-43/93 Van der Elst (1994) ECR I-03803. 
152 Cases 12/86 Demirel (1987) ECR 03719, C-18/90 Kziber (1991) ECR I-00199, C-235/99 Kondova 
(2001) ECR I-06427, C-265/03 Simutenkov (2005) ECR I-02579. 
153 See ex multis, A. Evans, ‘Third-Country Nationals and the Treaty on European Union’ [1994] 
EJIL 5; K. Hailbronner, ‘European Immigration and Asylum Law under the Amsterdam Treaty’ 
[1998] CMLR 35; J. Niessen, ‘Overlapping Interests and Conflicting Agendas: The Knocking into 
Shape of EU Immigration Policies’ [2001] EJML 3; J. Apap, ‘Shaping Europe’s Migration Policy 
New Regimes for the Employment of Third Country Nationals: a Comparison of Strategies in 
Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK’ [2002] EJML 4; A. Baldaccini and H. Toner, ‘From 
Amsterdam and Tampere to the Hague: An Overview of Five Years of EC Immigration and Asylum 
Law’ in A. Baldaccini, E. Guild, H. Toner (eds) Whose Freedom, Security and Justice? (Hart Publishing 
2007); E. Ozlem Atikcan, ‘Citizenship or Denizenship: The Treatment of Third Country Nationals 
in the European Union’ [2006] Sussex European Institute working paper, www.sei.ac.uk 
(05.02.2010) 
 VOLUME 4       EJLS   ISSUE 2 
 39 
nationals do benefit from rights that are directly applicable and enforceable both 
against their host Member State and against employers. 
 
EU immigration law is different. First, the rights of third-country nationals are not 
set in the Treaty text itself but in the secondary legislation, which takes form of 
directives. This strips the rights from horizontal direct effect, making them directly 
enforceable in national courts only against the state but not against private parties 
(most importantly, not against employers).154 Many provisions of EU directives on 
legal migration are difficult to enforce even against the state because their 
objectives are far from clear, their provisions are often optional and open-ended, 
leaving only effet utile as a last resort. 
 
Second, equality with host state nationals is an exception in EU immigration law, 
and is often limited to narrow fields. Presumption of inequality is particularly 
strong as regards access to economic activities (secured on quasi-equal footing with 
nationals only for long-term residents) and rights related to services financed from 
the public coffer. The latter include access to education, housing, and tax benefits, 
which are protected at a minimum-standard level.155 Equal treatment is more 
widespread as regards employment-related rights, such as working conditions, 
recognition of professional qualifications and freedom of association, where 
equality without reservations is secured in the Charter of Fundamental Rights156 
and reiterated in all immigration Directives as well as in some external agreements 
of the EU.157 Possibly, having the same rights secured in immigration directives 
and in the Charter also give these rights a direct horizontal effect, making them 
enforceable against employers without the need for national implementing 
measures. 
 
EU law differentiates the rights accorded to different immigrant groups, but the 
criterion employed for raising the level of rights is not the skill or economic 
activity of migrants. Priority instead is placed on securing rights for those already 
settled, while rights of newcomers persistently remain sidelined. This is in line 
                                            
154 For more on (the absence of) horizontal direct effect of directives see, T. Tridimas, ‘Horizontal 
Direct Effect of Directives: a Missed Opportunity?’ [1994] 19(6) ELRev 621-636, P.Crig, ‘Directives: 
Direct Effect, Indirect Effect, and the Construction of National Legislation’ [1997] 22 6 ELRev 519-
538, M. Lenz, ‘Horizontal What? Back to Basics’ [2000] 25 5 ELRev 509-522. 
155 Articles 12(c) Research Directive, 14 Blue Card Directive, 11 Long-Term Residence Directive. 
156 Articles 27-31 EU Fundamental Rights Charter. 
157 Articles 12 Research Directive, 14 Blue Card Directive, and 11 Long-Term Residence Directive. 
Equal treatment with host Member State nationals as regards working conditions is also granted in 
the external agreements of the EU – op.cit 84-86. 
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with the CIP objective of “fair” treatment,158 while at the same times undermining 
the objective of managing the composition of immigration flows. Equal treatment 
rights are widest for long-term residents, enhanced for Blue Card holders, and 
significantly reduced for researchers. The final policy choice is relegated to the 
national level, as each Member State may enhance differentiation by raising the 
level of rights for any immigrant group and facilitating naturalization (and thus the 
access to full rights of Union citizenship). Considering the low minimal level of 
rights ensured in EU law, the contribution of EU immigration law to positive self-
selection of migrants is negligible. 
4. Summary and Discussion 
 
The table below summarizes the results of the combined effect of the four 
Directives in terms of the costs and benefits imposed on researchers and Blue 
Card holders. For each of the areas regulated by EU immigration law, the middle 
column reflects the cost or benefit effect that should result to the highly-skilled in 
order to enhance their self-selection, as suggested by economics of migration; the 
last column reflects the corresponding situation under EU immigration law. Each 
factor is taken in isolation, other factors deemed equal. The inconsistencies 
between what is required to achieve the objectives of the CIP and the actual effects 
of EU Directives are highlighted in Bold. 
  Economics of migration EU immigration law 
Admission criteria 
COST 
Admission linked to 
employment 
COST 
Admission linked to 
employment 
Admission 
procedure 
BENEFIT 
Migration costs due to 
bureaucracy are high for all 
migrants but low for “wanted” 
migrants 
COST 
Migration costs due to 
bureaucracy and complexity are 
uniformly high for all migrants 
                                            
158 Policy Plan on Legal Migration (2005) COM 669 final; S. Castles, ‘Back to the Future? Can 
Europe Meet its Labor Needs through Temporary Migration?’ [2006] 1 Int. Migration Institute 
Working Paper 27. Single Permit Proposal, currently negotiated in the Council, has been 
qualitatively transformed from a horizontal instrument that protects rights of all third-country 
nationals who are allowed to work in the EU, into yet another vertical directive that regulates rights 
only of those who are admitted under a certain type of residence permit: compare the scope of the 
original proposal COM (2007) 638 final, Articles 2(b) and 3(1)b, to the amended version, 
interinstitutional file 2007/0229 (CNS) (30.06.2009), Articles 2 and 3. 
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Labor market size 
BENEFIT 
Enhanced geographic mobility 
for employment 
COST 
Restricted geographic mobility 
for employment 
Employment 
mobility 
BENEFIT 
Right to change jobs / branch / 
employers 
COST 
Right to change jobs / branch / 
employer restricted 
Family reunification 
BENEFIT 
Facilitation of family 
reunification rules 
BENEFIT 
Facilitation of family 
reunification rules 
Rights of family 
members 
BENEFIT 
Broad and immediate 
employment rights for 
admitted family members 
COST 
Access to employment for 
family members may be 
significantly limited 
Length of stay 
COST 
Temporary stay linked to 
employment 
COST 
Temporary stay linked to 
employment 
Security of 
residence rights 
BENEFIT 
Clear possibility of permanent 
stay for “wanted” migrants 
COST 
More difficult to attain 
permanent stay for “wanted” 
migrants 
Non-discrimination 
BENEFIT 
Strong non-discrimination, 
equal treatment and anti-
racism policy 
COST 
Equal treatment with nationals 
is only secured in selected 
fields as a derogation from the 
unequal treatment standard 
 
The table is revealing. In six cases out of nine, EU immigration law establishes 
rules contrary to the objectives of EU immigration policy, imposing a cost on 
migrants instead of conferring benefits. While economics of immigration suggest 
that only two of the nine factors should be restrictive in order to implement 
selective immigration policy biased towards the highly-skilled, the only 
liberalization granted to “wanted” immigrants in EU law is facilitation of family 
reunification for Blue Card holders. The other eight factors – and for researchers 
all nine – amount to an overall restriction, which will reduce the net benefits of 
migrating to the EU. This is a surprising result if we believe in the scarcity of 
“wanted” workers both in the EU and globally. Under a shortage of highly-skilled 
workers, provisions of immigration law that decrease net benefits to this group of 
migrants can be expected to cause a fall in their overall number and a loss for the 
destination economy and its business. Economic considerations and interests of 
national economies are what Member State governments and EU institutions argue 
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to justify the adoption of EU immigration law. Yet, the substance of the adopted 
law jeopardizes the achievement of these goals. 
  
Evaluation of EU law on legal economic immigration depends largely on our 
benchmark. The Directives enhance legal venues for economic migration in 
comparison to the previous European rules. Western Europe evolved from a low-
skilled labor immigration policy in the 1960s to a zero labor immigration policy in 
the 1990s, and a temporary admission policy for the highly-skilled workers 
presently. These are radical changes over a very short time span. Both the 
magnitude of change and the brief period available for its implementation present 
a considerable challenge that might be insurmountable simply because of the 
natural length of human life cycle. Measuring the directives by reference to the 
rights of nationals of the Member States also presents a coherent picture, 
considering the restrictions on free movement of workers from new Member States 
and the fact that naturalization policies remain within the sole competence of each 
European nation. Yet, these comparisons do not reflect the reality that in 
competing for the “wanted” immigrants, the EU and its constituent countries do 
not challenge themselves or their own citizens but the traditional countries of 
immigration. 
 
The goals of EU policy on legal immigration reveal a thoroughly confused vision of 
European policy-maker. Presuming that the objectives as set are legitimate and 
desirable, they are incoherent between themselves. Thus, the objective of 
eliminating competition between Member States for highly-skilled third-country 
workers, in situation where no unified EU immigration space is created, is 
counterproductive to the objective of attracting these workers to Europe; the 
objective of temporary labor immigration runs counter to the objective of “fair 
treatment” of third-country nationals, when one of the criteria set for such 
treatment is availability of stable residence rights; EU development objectives 
might also come in conflict with the objective of attracting the highly-skilled, 
which may contribute to brain drain in the countries of origin despite the 
framework of circular migration. Such examples abound. Inconsistencies in the 
conception of EU policy on legal economic immigration certainly are unhelpful at 
the implementation stage. Claims of the Council and the Commission that Europe 
as a whole needs third-country workers with high professional skills are difficult to 
reconcile with the other claims of these same actors to the effect that labor needs 
vary across Member States. Controversial political nature of immigration 
complicates the adoption of EU immigration law, resulting in multiple optional 
clauses, which de facto delegate the finality of the CIP to national level. The 
underlying assumption seems to be that immigrant admission and selection rules 
are somehow different from the rules regulating the rights of immigrants once 
admitted. Yet, economics of immigration predict that both immigrant-selection 
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and rights-regulating provisions affect the volume and the composition of 
immigration flow. The artificial division of labor between the Union and national 
levels splits the capacity to select, complicating the achievement of EU policy goals 
more. 
 
The picture is equally contradictory in substance of the adopted rules. The overall 
approach of EU immigration law follows economics of immigration: the law 
differentiates between the different groups of immigrants by varying both the 
admission criteria and the rights once admitted. However, these groups are not 
defined by their professional skills. This mismatch between the objectives of EU 
immigration policy and the structure of law undermine the attainment of EU 
policy goals. When it comes to the substantive rights accorded to “wanted” third-
country workers, EU law imposes an overall cost on these migrants, rendering 
immigrating to Europe less attractive for them than for third-country nationals 
generally. It is not possible to attract the people without giving them benefits; 
offering benefits without discriminating between people by skill will not increase 
the share of the skills we desire. If economic considerations are the force of gravity 
that pull together policy and the law, than EU immigration law is drifting in outer 
space. 
 
